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Under the Façade of Benevolence: Psy-Wars, Amnesty and Defectors in America’s Asian Wars

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ABSTRACT
This paper examines American amnesty and defector programs and their connection to larger counter-insurgency operations in the Korean War, Philippines, and Vietnam. In each of the three cases, the recruitment of defectors and offer of amnesty was an important aspect of information management, the essence of political warfare. Drawing off European colonial precedents, the programs aimed to give off the illusion of a benevolent state to justify the repression of those failing to come over to the American side. Public relations efforts presented defections as voluntary when they often resulted from war weariness, short-term expedience or practical necessity and from intensive psychological warfare campaigns. Recruits were most valued as intelligence assets and native scouts nicknamed Kit Carsons after the Cavalry adviser who gave a reward for Navajo scalps.

KEYWORDS
Psychological warfare; amnesty; counterinsurgency; defectors; human rights

In November 1952, Look Magazine published an essay by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas ‘The Man Who Saved the Philippines from Red Conquest’ which provided a fawning portrait of Filipino Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay. Written after a sojourn to the Far East designed to develop strategies for defeating communism, the article starts with a story about how Magsaysay was able to convert a leftist Huk guerrilla sent to assassinate him into ‘one of his apostles’ who ‘now went about the land preaching the evils of communism’. Tomas Santiago, 32, had been Huk leader Luis Taruc’s ‘faithful’ bodyguard, who had sat around rural campfires hearing stories about government injustices. He was so impressed by Magsaysay, that in the course of a pre-arranged meeting, he emptied his pockets of grenades, handed over his pistol and said: ‘I came to kill you. Now please let me work for you’. Mr. Santiago was especially impressed with Magsaysay’s amnesty program in which he provided vocational training and helped surrendered guerrillas get a job or settle on a farm or with a business after being paroled. Douglas wrote that ‘many an ex-Huk under Magsaysay’s supervision is becoming a Main Street merchant and a member of the hated bourgeoisie against whom the communists rail’.1

This story, retold in CIA agent Edward Lansdale’s autobiography, has never been corroborated.2 However, it epitomized the importance attributed to amnesty programs in luring Huk guerrillas and was part of a public relations campaign designed to create a positive image of U.S. allies in the Cold War. The campaign was so effective that Magsaysay assumed a heroic status in American popular culture. The narrator in Robert Heinlein’s popular 1959 science fiction novel, Starship Troopers, for example, advocates for naming a naval ship after Magsaysay, whom he says was ‘a great man, great soldier’ who would ‘probably be chief of psychological warfare if...
he were alive today [the novel is set centuries in the future]. The casual reader may not have contemplated the darker side of this latter job. As part of the ‘patriotic fun and games’, Lansdale and Magsaysay adopted macabre tactics such as the ‘vampire trick’ in which the Filipino army spread rumors of a ‘terrifying vampire operating in the Huk jungle area’, sent guerrillas to snatch and kill the last man of a Huk patrol, drained his body of blood and then placed it up on a hook as evidence of the alleged vampire. The end of the Douglas’ piece has Magsaysay boasting about paying a Huk commander to host a jungle-picnic for 26 die-hard Huks who refused to surrender. When the commander quietly slipped aside, the army staged an ambush and massacred all the Huks.

This paper examines American amnesty and defector programs and their connection to larger counter-insurgency operations in the Korean War, Philippines, and Vietnam. In each of the three cases, the recruitment of defectors and offer of amnesty was an important aspect of information management, the essence of political warfare. Drawing off European colonial precedents, the programs aimed to give off the illusion of a benevolent state to justify the repression of those failing to come over to the American side. Public relations efforts presented defections as voluntary when they often resulted from war weariness, short-term expedience or practical necessity and from intensive psychological warfare campaigns. Recruits were most valued as intelligence assets and native scouts nicknamed Kit Carsons after the Cavalry adviser who gave a reward for Navajo scalps.

Ignored by most military and Cold War historians, the study of American psychological warfare, amnesty and defection programs has been confined primarily to practitioners of counterinsurgency whose aim is to instruct the army on applying counterinsurgency tactics more efficiently. Often these military intellectuals promote a useable history that distorts or sanitizes aspects of the past. They claim that counterinsurgency is a more humane form of warfare, when evidence shows otherwise. The Philippines is depicted as a particularly great success when thousands were killed in the American-backed counterinsurgency and the country remained a neo-colony. Many of the same analysts also insist that the Vietnam War could have been won if counterinsurgency tactics had been more consistently applied. This essay seeks to correct the historical record, show the underside of U.S. psy-war and counterinsurgency tactics, and refute the myth about the Philippine success and Vietnam Lost Cause. The latter myth was promoted by Edward Lansdale himself as a form of psychological warfare in order to salvage his own reputation and cast blame for America’s defeat on a number of villains.

The existing scholarship on the Cold War in Southeast Asia provides a mixed assessment of U.S. foreign policy, with some authors blaming the communists for provoking American intervention, and others depicting U.S. policy as part of a larger imperialistic drive. Works exposing America’s involvement in wide-scale atrocities have failed to affect popular consciousness. In a November 2014 speech before the G20 Summit in Australia, U.S. president Barack Obama offered the conventional claim that ‘generations of Americans’ had ‘served and died [here] so that the people of the Asia Pacific might live free’. This essay shows however, that in reality the U.S. used violent methods masqueraded under a benevolent rhetoric to crush popular nationalist forces in Southeast Asia and brought only the kind of stability enforced by other imperial powers. Figures like Lansdale were crucial to the effective marketing of U.S. policy on the continent, which persists to this day.

**Definition and colonial precedents**

Since the time of the American revolution, amnesty and defector programs have been a pivotal component of American psychological warfare operations, which have been designed to ‘affect the enemy’s mind’ according to an army intelligence veteran, and ‘persuade him to take an action, even against his conscious will, that is favorable to his opponent’. According to
journalist Christopher Simpson, psychological warfare is a translated mutation of the Nazi term *Weltanschauungskrieg* (literally, worldview warfare), meaning the purportedly scientific application of propaganda, terror and state pressure as a means of securing ideological victory. The United States has always presented itself as an enlightened liberal power that is non-imperialistic and intervenes in other countries for altruistic purposes. Psychological warfare is a key in helping sustain this illusion while being used as a cover to advance sinister black operations making use of defectors. These operations drew directly from colonial powers like the British who recruited loyalists from among insurgents and their supporters and triggered or intensified civil conflicts that ‘scarred the communities embroiled in them for decades’, as historians David L. Anderson and Adam Branch note.

Historian David A. Charters points out that the failure of British counterinsurgency operations in Northern Ireland from 1919 to 1921 prompted a rethinking of strategy by colonial military officers who came to understand counter-guerrilla war as above all else a psychological and political war. In his 1937 book *British Rule and Rebellion*, Colonel H.J. Stimson advocated for a more effective intelligence service whose aim was to penetrate the insurgency and use deception tactics to win popular support. This book was written on the eve of the Arab revolt in British-ruled Palestine, and helped shape British counterinsurgency strategy during the Malayan campaign against pro-communist insurgents in the early 1950s. Sir Gerald Templer seconded thirty military intelligence officers there to work inside the police special branch with the goal of penetrating, using deception and manipulating the communist insurgent organizations. Templer emphasized that surrendered guerrillas were the most valuable of intelligence sources who ‘could be exploited for their immediate operational value’.

This blueprint provided a framework for the development of colonial defector and amnesty programs by both British colonial agents and their American counterparts. The U.S. army and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tellingly sent police intelligence agents to Malaya to study the methods of Britain’s special branch and employed British counterinsurgency specialists like Sir Robert Thompson to import colonial methods in the Philippines, Vietnam and other Cold War trouble-spots. Like with their British counterparts, these latter campaigns were framed as part of a righteous struggle against communist terrorists, a characterization that was part of the psy-war deception. The U.S. was actually fighting revolutionary nationalists who, while subscribing to communist ideals and prone to ample violence, reflected popular aspirations for a more socially just society free from foreign domination.

**Doping the public: psy-war in Korea**

After World War II, the U.S. forged an informal empire in Southeast Asia designed to ensure American control over strategic waterways and trade and a chain of military bases from Okinawa through the Ryukyus Islands. The region provided an important laboratory for counterinsurgency and social control techniques, which were key to sustaining the illusion that America was non-imperial. In a 1960 study *The Rising American Empire*, historian Richard Van Alstyne noted that in side-stepping terms that would even hint at aggression or imperial domination, American foreign policy ‘developed a vocabulary all its own’ that ‘took refuge in abstract formulae and idealistic clichés that explain nothing. The assumption is always that American diplomacy is different, purer morally than the diplomacy of other powers’. Psychological warfare contributed to this deep-seated assumption through its efforts to convey the alleged humanitarian and uplifting function of U.S. foreign policy. American policy-makers framed it that they were saving Southeast Asia from aggressive Chinese hordes following the Chinese communist revolution of 1949, which-promoted social justice for the poor peasantry and state-directed economic development as a means of overcoming China’s status as the ‘sick man of Asia’.
During the 1950s, Hollywood films reinforced the perception that China and the North Koreans had developed effective ‘brainwashing’ techniques that had allegedly compelled 5,000 of 7,200 American Prisoners of War (POWs) to sign confessions or petitions calling for an end to the war (a small number also signed confessions admitting to deployment of germ warfare while 21 Americans defected to the communist side). Journalist Edward Hunter in a CIA subsidized book, *Brainwashing in Red China*, characterized the Chinese approach of ideological indoctrination and system of rewards and punishment as ‘psychological warfare on a scale incalculably more immense than any militarist of the past has envisaged’. In testimony before Congress in March 1958, Hunter stated that war in this new era had ‘changed its form. The communists have discovered that a man killed by a bullet is useless. He can dig no coal. They have discovered that a demolished city is useless. Its mills produce no cloth. The object of communist warfare is to capture intact the minds of the people and their possessions so they can be put to use’. According to Hunter, the U.S. needed to adapt and outwit the communists at their own game since ‘communist psychological warfare was winning such extensive victories’ that the ‘red bloc’ would ‘not need to employ direct military force against us [in the future] in order to win the total war which they are waging’.

Hunter’s spirit lay behind the ‘Operation Come On’ which was initiated by the head of the Army’s psychological warfare branch, J. Woodall Greene, a month into the Korean War in July 1950. Directed by William C. Westmoreland, the future Army Chief of Staff, it used loudspeaker messages and radio broadcasts to induce defection, dropped over half a billion psychological warfare leaflets, and went into villages offering incentives for civilians to support the South Korean government. A key aim was to dissuade South Korean youths from ‘flocking to the standards of North Korea’ and ‘throwing in the sponge when the fortunes of war turned against them’.

The Truman administration subsequently issued an executive directive for the creation of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) whose mission was to enable the United States to ‘put to work something more powerful than dollars and weapons – the power of ideas’. In August 1951, the PSB formulated a voluntary repatriation program in which North Korean and Chinese POWs at the Koje-do Island prison south of Pusan were screened and then given the choice of returning home or defecting to South Korea or Taiwan. Making loud appeals to the ‘conscience of the world’, American leaders claimed that hardened anticommunists would face ‘certain death at the hands of [communist] execution squads’. The program was generally designed to reinforce United Nations support for granting asylum to refugees fleeing tyranny and to show the moral superiority of the ‘free world’ over communism in its emphasis on individual choice and freedom.

The Truman administration boasted at the end of the war that the ‘voluntary repatriation’ program had produced 50,000 defectors. CIA Director Allen Dulles called this ‘one of the greatest psychological victories ever’. The 50,000 figure was inflated, however. Historians estimate that the number of POWs who chose not to repatriate to North Korea or China was under 23,000. Some of those were Chinese nationalist or ROK soldiers who had been impressed into service in the communist armies. General Matthew Ridgeway, who succeeded Douglas McArthur as UN commanding General, reported that 37,000 prisoners in seven of the seventeen compounds of Koje-do could not be screened without the use of force. According to prisoners interviewed by pro-communist journalists Wilfred G. Burchett and Alan Winnington, those who resisted ‘voluntary’ repatriation could be sent to a compound known as the ‘graveyard’, where they were scalded with hot water, beaten, had flesh and arms cut off, or were shot or hung on gibbets. Sadistic guards would slash those who said they wanted to go home with a dagger and rub ground pepper in the wound and then ask: ‘Do you still want to go back to the communists?’

Ha Jin in his award winning historical novel, *War Trash*, features a Chinese protagonist who wants to go home to his family but has been forcibly tattooed with ‘Fuck Communism’ on his torso and depicts a Chinese Guomindang (GMD) guard slicing flesh off another prisoner who...
insisted on going home, then eating it to intimidate the others. Jin originally thought the story was communist propaganda but found it to be true, and it was even mentioned in GMD propaganda.\textsuperscript{35}

A centerpiece of the ‘voluntary repatriation’ program was the implementation of an ‘ambitious program of political indoctrination after capture’, which mimicked the communist approach of lecturing U.S. POWs on Marxist-Leninist theory and the evils of Wall Street.\textsuperscript{36} At Koje-do, the Civil Information and Education section (CIE) of the Far East Command provided classes in the precepts of Western democracy, virtues of the free enterprise system and evils of communism. It sent over 350 educational films, and enlisted South Korean educators, businessmen, diplomats, Guomindang luminaries to give lectures along with Christian missionaries like Cardinal Francis Spellman and a Reverend Earle J. Woodbury who sermonized against godless communism in Chinese.\textsuperscript{37}

An army study, ‘Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea’, gave a negative evaluation of the program, finding that POW interrogation was ‘poor and imperfectly organized’, and that the messages were ‘slanted’ by Chinese Guomindang ‘pseudo-intellectuals’ who were widely reviled.\textsuperscript{38} POWs greeted military interrogation teams with homemade cudgels and refused to enter the interrogation rooms for screening. The military branded those that were resisting as ‘Oriental communist fanatics’ and attacked them with concussion grenades. Seventy-seven POWs were killed and 140 wounded in one single incident in Koje-do’s compound 62.\textsuperscript{39}

Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington characterized the concept of ‘voluntary repatriation’ as a ‘psychological pill to dope the public’. Those subjected to ‘reeducation’, they said, were forced to ‘read Fascist rubbish’ such as ‘A Study of China’s Destiny’ by Chiang Kai Shek [Guomindang leader], and taught ‘hymns of hate against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union and Communism’.\textsuperscript{40} Mou Ping-Yun, a Koje-do prisoner who had returned to North Korea by parachute as a secret agent, described prisoners being forced to sing songs in praise of Chiang and against Mao Zedong. Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm was beaten with a bamboo rod. Guomindang agents would then chant slogans and beat some of the prisoners on the charge of ‘contempt for lectures’. The inmates took to calling the classes ‘blood classes’ because of the ‘blood left in the classes every time’.\textsuperscript{41}

These reflections dovetail with a pattern of brutality at Koje-do revealed in Red Cross investigations, cables by British Foreign Office diplomats and other archival records though few media reports because, as General Mark Clark pointed out, ‘great care was taken to make sure newspapers did not get the story’.\textsuperscript{42} Defectors tattooed with anticommunist slogans like ‘Down with Kim Il Sung’, ‘Oppose Communism, Resist Russia’ or ‘Freedom or Death!’ signed petitions in blood.\textsuperscript{43} Tattooing was historically a disreputable custom in China used to brand thieves and evil doers.\textsuperscript{44} Chiang had adopted the practice in the Chinese civil war in an attempt to stem defections from within his own army. After taking the blood oath, defectors were dropped behind enemy lines in North Korea from C-46 transport planes clad in Chinese People’s Army uniforms for participation in dangerous clandestine missions.\textsuperscript{45} According to Burchett and Winnington, many of the defectors had gone mad from the prolonged torture and agony of life in Koje-do. This combined with their ideological indoctrination resulted in a level of ‘fanaticism in combat’, according to another history ‘seldom found in any army’.\textsuperscript{46}

Cardinal Francis Spellman claimed that the tattooed Chinese ‘wanted to be placed in the frontlines of the UN forces’ so they could ‘demonstrate actively their opposition to Communist rule in their country’.\textsuperscript{47} His remarks were part of the propaganda campaign that helped spin policies that promoted torture and the illegal use of prisoners as spies into ones that conveyed the moral superiority of the United States. That is the essence of psychological warfare. It succeeded to such a remarkable degree that the defector programs provided a basis for stalling peace talks and prolonging the Korean War for an extra year and a half; and a blueprint for many other psywar operations.\textsuperscript{48}
Illusion of an army with a social conscience: psy-war and the anti-Huk campaign in the Philippines

In June 1953, Democratic Party presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson wrote an article in *Look Magazine* lamenting the situation in Indochina where the United States and its French allies had ‘all the conventional advantages – aviation, weapons’ but were fighting a ‘quicksilver foe which could not be crushed’. The situation was far better in the Philippines because of Ramon Magsaysay, who had ‘done a truly great job of reorganizing the Philippines army and cleaning up the [Communist] Huks’ using the weapons of ‘competence, courage and compassion’.49

Stevenson’s article was emblematic of the psy-war campaign, which presented Magsaysay as a knight in shining armor leading the noble fight against ‘fanatical communists’ through astute statesmanship, curbing corruption and striking a balance between military action and liberal reform. Samuel Wells Stagg, an American missionary and correspondent for the Philippines Free Press, noted, however, that in the Central Luzon region, about half the people in ‘dissident infested areas’ were pro-Huk and considered Luis Taruc, the Huk leader, and not Magsaysay to be a hero.50

Short for Hukbalahap or ‘People’s Army Against Foreign Invaders,’ the Huk originated like their North Korean counterpart in anti-Japanese resistance and peasant grievances over land distribution, graft, social and gender inequality and the displacement of the peasants by large sugar and lumbering interests tied to regional politicians. Seeing themselves as completing the anti-colonial revolution that had begun over fifty years earlier, they adopted the slogan ‘bullets not ballots’ after leader Luis Taruc and six others were prevented from taking their Congressional seats in 1946.51 General Douglas McArthur told his staff at the end of World War II that the Huk movement emerged in a region [Luzon Province] where the land was ‘owned in Madrid or Chicago or some other distant place … [and] there were few schools and little participation in government [and the people are] utterly hopeless’. McArthur added that if he ‘worked in those sugar fields, I’d probably be a Huk myself’.52

The U.S. embassy and political establishment, however, followed the viewpoint of CIA agent Edward Lansdale who described Huk leaders as ‘communist inspired’ and ‘true disciples of Karl Marx’.53 To stamp them out, Lansdale and his team drew on turn of the 20th century counterinsurgency techniques in which military officers trained constabulary agents in psychological warfare, built schools and set up prison camps where ex-nationalist guerrillas got land to farm and could earn privileges through good behavior.54 Romanticizing the colonial period, Lansdale joked about renewed efforts to ‘civilize them with a Krag [standard issue rifle]’, the title of a pro-colonialist song sung by U.S. soldiers during the Spanish-American Philippines war.55

Flunking out of the University of the Philippines, Magsaysay’s lack of leadership qualifications was evident at a 1952 press conference that he gave in Washington, D.C. where he ‘did not know who Adenauer and Schumacher are, did not know what the Bonn Treaty is, nor the difference between Tehran and Yalta’, as Carlos Romulo, Philippine ambassador wrote to American Ambassador Myron Cowen.56 Despite the myth cultivated about his humble background (‘a carpenter’s son’ in *Time* and ‘farm boy’ in *Reader’s Digest*), Magsaysay had come from a family that owned several farms (one in excess of 1,000 acres) and a general store. As a branch manager of a bus company he had broken a strike that erupted in protest of his high-handed disciplinary methods, and profited from a contract to transport U.S. military troops.57

William Pomeroy, a World War II veteran who joined the Communist Party USA as a factory worker in Rochester, New York and took up arms in support of the Huk, considered Magsaysay a ‘Huk killer’ and one of the ‘most perfect puppets who ever danced on a U.S. string’. This was because of Magsaysay’s eager backing of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, allowance for an expansion of U.S. military bases, and adoption of economic policies that catered to U.S. business interests who donated $250,000 to his presidential campaign.58 (At times, Magsaysay acted independently, frustrating American efforts to obtain a new base treaty, and failing to enact land
reform, though overall served U.S. objectives well and was dependent on U.S. military aid to the tune of $30 million per year.\textsuperscript{59}

Possessing an uncanny ability to solve personal disputes through direct mediation, Magsaysay had acquired an expertise in guerrilla warfare fighting the Japanese in World War II and was appointed by General Douglas McArthur as military governor of the Zambales Province. In 1946, Magsaysay won election to the House of Representatives as a member of the Liberal Party and impressed Lansdale when the two met after he had become chair of the House committee on National Defense. Major Leland Hobbs, head of the U.S. military advisory assistance group (MAAG) and ambassador Myron Cowen subsequently converged on Filipino President Elpidio Quirino ‘like a herd of salesmen’ urging Magsaysay’s appointment as Defense Secretary, making it clear that the U.S. would provide more foreign aid if he complied. In his new position, Magsaysay began demoting army officers for not killing enough ‘bandits’, urged Quirino to suspend habeus corpus, and appointed as a special adviser his former army commander Napoleon Valeriano, whom the Huks considered a ‘blood thirsty triggerman’ who caused the massacre of more than seventy civilians in San Il Defenso, Bulacan.\textsuperscript{60}

The CIA brought in a New York Republican Party attorney, Gabriel Kaplan, who had experience combatting electoral fraud and corruption in the United States, to aid in Magsaysay’s election as president and to burnish his image as a ‘fearless gunslinger’ and ‘man of the people’.\textsuperscript{61} Magsaysay came to receive over $3 million in campaign donations from the CIA as part of what Quirino considered a ‘colossal effort to intervene in [Filipino] political affairs’ that ‘made a mockery of our [Philippines] national sovereignty’. A wheelchair bound CIA officer, David T. Sternberg, wrote many of Magsaysay’s speeches while Lansdale served as his eminence grise.\textsuperscript{62}

Made famous by two of the most celebrated Cold War novels, The Quiet American and The Ugly American, whose lead characters were loosely modeled after him, Lansdale was a former advertising man and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent who set up a Civil Affairs Office in the Philippines to apply ‘Madison Avenue’ techniques to help sell Magsaysay and the American ideal of consumer capitalism in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{63} Lacking the condescension of many of his colleagues, Lansdale would talk and listen to ordinary people and offered ideas about America’s great mission to reform Asia that sounded convincing. His political savvy was apparent in his sexual liaison with a Huk sympathizer, and central role in the recovery of buried Japanese gold in the Philippines, which was used to fund CIA covert operations.\textsuperscript{64} According to Reuters Correspondent Peter Richards, Lansdale was so smooth that he could have made his ‘houseboy’ president.\textsuperscript{65}

In 1951, under Lansdale’s guidance, Magsaysay spearheaded the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), which offered amnesty to Huk defectors, implying immunity from criminal prosecution and torture, and a loan and 15-acre plot of land in the province of Mindanao along with tools and seeds to grow crops, free transportation, schools, medical care and clean water. Other basic necessities, such as farm animals and an initial supply of food was sold to them on credit. In exchange, the ex-guerillas promised to farm the land, repay the government for start-up costs, and accept advice from the Philippine Department of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{66}

William Pomeroy was among the Huks offered amnesty in the vain hope that he and his wife Celia (a Huk commander) would ‘tell all they [knew] about the Huks’.\textsuperscript{67} Magsaysay characterized the program as successful in ‘inspiring the [peasant’s] confidence. Through EDCOR, your armed forces have said to the Huks: “As guardians of our nation’s safety, it is our duty to hunt you down and kill you if you do not surrender”. But as fellow Filipinos, we would rather help you return to a happy Filipino way of life and [to establish] a good life for themselves in the lands of Mindanao … Working in the new settlement in friendly cooperatives are members of the armed forces [who] demonstrate by actual deed that a democratic army is a people’s army – not a club to be held over their cowering heads but a force dedicated to the protection and welfare of every decent citizen of our republic.’\textsuperscript{68}
The latter comments reflect the prioritization of army civic action programs, such as well-digging, which Lansdale later acknowledged was a ‘gimmick’ designed for intelligence-gathering purposes and to ‘help form a political base’.69 The U.S. at this time was supplying crates of weapons and advisory training through military specialists from Greece and Korea ‘expert in suppressing people’s movements’, as William Pomeroy put it. The Philippines army combed the countryside using bloodhounds Magsaysay had requested, and terrorized villages through bombing by P-51 Mustangs (‘glistening machines of death’ as Pomeroy termed them).70

Alvin H. Scaff, a professor of sociology at Pomona College, provided a paean to Magsaysay in his 1955 book, The Philippine Answer to Communism, as part of the effort to sanitize the violence of the war. Traveling to the Philippines as a Fulbright scholar, Scaff said that he ‘hiked long hours through the jungle, waded through tropical rivers, and slept on bamboo slat beds until he felt the pulse beat of the democratic brotherhood that has turned back the communist advance’. Scaff then described how the army helped clear barren jungle for settlement like the frontiersmen of yesteryear and provided credit to ex-Huk settlers that enabled them to buy tools and food. They then set up villages that included health care clinics and recreational facilities, and enabled the ex-Huk settlers to prosper as self-sufficient farmers, undercutting the Huk platform of providing ‘land for the landless’.71

Scaff profiled settlers who had ‘soaked up communist doctrine’ under the instruction of William Pomeroy, who according to Justice Douglas had instilled in the young Huks a ‘passion for class warfare’. Scaff expressed confidence, however, that given enough time, ‘the free air of a healthy democracy’ would dissipate ‘even the most stubborn of communist doctrine’. One settler told him: ‘for the first time in my life, I have experienced a true democracy. The soldiers do not persecute us; they act as friends. If we have a complaint we can talk with the farm administration. And we elect our own leaders to the town council’. Scaff in turn quoted a newsman who said: ‘I have seen many armies but this one beats them all. This is an army with a social conscience’.72

The latter comments epitomize the image Magsaysay effectively cultivated through EDCOR of the Philippines’ army as a benevolent force, which helped win him a broad political constituency. The Constabulary had previously earned many enemies through its extortionist practices and adoption of cruel methods to extract information.73 Napoleon Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan in their 1962 book Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience characterized EDCOR as an ‘advertising stunt’ whose ‘value in selling the good intentions of government to the governed was tremendous’.74 Robert Shaplen reported that the response of Central Luzon’s farmers to the program, however, was predominantly ‘apathetic’. Huk leader Luis Taruc said the Huk laughed at it, believing that if they surrendered they would be charged with other offenses and that their land would be seized.75 A Huk pamphlet devoted to EDCOR depicted the farms as concentration camps enclosed with barbed wire fences guided by soldiers at sentry boxes and inhabited by ex-Huks in chains.76

This latter depiction was obviously an exaggeration. Justice William O. Douglas nevertheless noted that Chinese moneylenders provided four units of rice to the resettled ex-Huk in return for ten units payable the next spring, placing many farmers into debt. Douglas noted that ‘being illiterate’, the new settlers were ‘prey to every exploiter who comes along’. Despite his praise for Magsaysay, he concluded that the Mindanao land distribution project [EDCOR] was a ‘scandal’ which should have prompted a ‘housecleaning starting from the top’, and that rural discontent ‘was as great as ever’.77

Both Douglas and Charles Bohannan doubted that more than 300 Huk families were resettled, though Bohannen said he could guarantee that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered. Homesteads became a reward not merely for surrendering but for participating in counter-guerrilla operations where they could receive cash rewards for assistance leading to the death or capture of Huk leaders. According to Valeriano and Bohannan, Huk defectors played a crucial role as spies and infiltrators and in bounty-hunter operations, which resulted in wide-scale killing and the
decimation of the Huk.\textsuperscript{78} A principal Filipino architect of Magsaysay’s agrarian programs tellingly, was a member of the secret police.\textsuperscript{79}

Historian Vina Lanzona in an essay in *Hearts and Minds: A People’s History of Counterinsurgency*, emphasizes the displacement of communities in Huk-dominated Central Luzon Province through EDCOR and other resettlement schemes, which were part of a COIN strategy designed to isolate Huk guerrillas. The net effect, she writes, was that families were torn apart, children were abandoned by their parents and women, more often than not, were left to sustain their families by themselves.\textsuperscript{80} Samuel Wells Stagg had come in contact with barrio folk forcibly relocated during military sweeps, and stated that ‘he would not keep a pig under the conditions in which these people were forced to live. They had no shelter, no sanitary facilities, and the flies swarmed so thick that not a square inch of their food was free of them’.\textsuperscript{81}

These conditions were suppressed as part of the carefully managed psychological warfare campaign, which extended to the American public. The State Department and CIA cultivated close ties with academics like Scaff, magazine editors and journalists like Peggy Durdin, who heralded Magsaysay for his ‘great physical courage’ in fighting the Huk terrorists and providing cash gifts to Huk informants, leading to the capture of Huk commanders.\textsuperscript{82} Robert Aura Smith, a member of the *New York Times* editorial board who had lived in the Philippines, characterized Alvin Scaff’s book in *The Times* as a ‘bright and moving human document’, that splendidly told the story of EDCOR, which he said provided an ‘effective answer to the elusive promises of the communists’.\textsuperscript{83}

Despite CIA backing and adoption of blackmail tactics against his opponents, Magsaysay, however, could only win an election marred by violence and reversed progress made on tenancy legislation during his presidency and failed to enact land reform. He filled his Cabinet with joint venture capitalists, sugar barons, and career bureaucrats who were part of his political base, used foreign aid for patronage and promoted trade pacts that eased U.S. duties and privileged U.S. corporations and investors.\textsuperscript{84} Filipino columnist Hilarion M. Henares Jr. pointed out that Lansdale’s ‘vampire trick’,

made Filipinos vomit. Lansdale would never desecrate the body of a white American …

But not the Filipinos, who are dung, who are of an inferior race, and whose bodies may be desecrated, drained of blood and left to rot in the jungles …. It was Lansdale and the CIA who taught our armed forces that they have a license to torture Filipinos who are enemies of Americans. The water cure, the electric cattle prod, the high voltage electrodes applied to testicles and nipples, the coke bottles forced into the vagina, the rubber hose and the pliers, are all techniques taught to our soldiers by U.S. Special Forces.\textsuperscript{85}

Disregarding the Filipino perspective, the U.S. army has since produced over two dozen studies analyzing the winning tactics employed by Magsaysay to help defeat the Huks.\textsuperscript{86} The reason for this number is that so many other foreign policy interventions failed dismally to live up to their objectives. Colonel Kalev I. Sepp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, wrote in a new foreword to Valeriano and Bohannan’s *Counter-Guerrilla Operations*: ‘In a time of global turmoil, in the age of the guerrilla, what could have been more useful than analysis of how a nascent democracy [Philippines under Magsaysay] reformed its army and police, rallied its people, and changed its policies to defeat an insurgency? In the 21st century these lessons remain important. And they will always be’.\textsuperscript{87}

Sepp’s conclusion exemplifies the promotion of a ‘useable past’ designed to bring back Lansdale’s theories and justify the adoption of population-centric counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{88} Max Boot, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow, considers the anti-Huk campaign ‘one of the CIA’s biggest covert action successes ever [that was] achieved by one man’s
Lansdale’s] deft manipulation of local politics rather than through costly American spending or heavy handed American military action’. 89

This ethnocentric assessment overstates Lansdale’s role, and ignores the fact that Lansdale advocated for robust military measures including creation of airborne assault teams employing helicopters and ‘the more liberal use of napalm’. 90 The Huks furthermore, sustained armed resistance into the late 1960s because the grievances of the peasant population were addressed only superficially through EDCOR. 91 A Huk underground plenum significantly concluded that its setbacks did not derive from Lansdale and Magsaysay’s reforms, but because of an erroneous estimate that a revolutionary situation existed in 1950 and the failure to develop a united front form of organization or to gain the participation of those not ready to take up arms. Other analysts point to an artificial boom in the Philippines economy because of the Korean War and suggest that the regionally rooted Huks made a major mistake when they killed the beloved wife of the former president Manuel Quezon.92

With the Huks’ eventual defeat, the Philippines remained an American neo-colony, hosting U.S. military bases, providing a favorable investment climate for companies like Caltex, which established a refinery with capacity for producing 16,000 barrels of oil daily, and provided troops and training for covert operations across Southeast Asia.93 Nowhere is this mentioned by Sepp or Boot who also ignore the fact that Lansdale’s squeaky clean boy-scout image ‘masked a perverse delight in atrocity’, as historian Douglas Valentine put it.94 After Magsaysay died in a plane crash, the Philippines fell into dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos.95 The notion of an army with a social conscience and successful counterinsurgency is nothing more than an illusion; which was used to legitimize subsequent counterinsurgency operations including in Vietnam.

‘Try to win him over and make use of him:’ Chieu Hoi and the Vietnam War

Vietnam provided a more extended laboratory than Philippines for psychological warfare practices, which were designed to counteract those of the Communist Vietminh. In a 1968 article in Military Review, Colonel William F. Johnston wrote that from the early stages of the Vietminh-French conflict [lasting from 1946 to 1954], North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s ‘guiding principal, according to General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, were armed propaganda’, which would insure that ‘political activities were more important than military activities’, and ‘fighting less important than propaganda’. The end goal was ‘not to attempt to overthrow the enemy, but to try to win him over and make use of him’.96 Under Lansdale’s direction, the United States sought to coopt these methods and defeat the master at his own game. Lansdale wrote that ‘in a revolutionary people’s war, the people of the country actually constitute the true battleground of the war… Once that is fully understood, we will then realize the importance of political-psychological actions’.97

Lansdale was sent to South Vietnam in 1954 to help build a client regime under anticommunist Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem, who was envisioned as the next Magsaysay. Diem lacked any political legitimacy, however, as he favored Catholics over the dominant Buddhist majority, had sat out the anti-French war in exile, and adopted an arcane philosophy called personalism that lacked appeal to the masses.98 The Vietnamese furthermore were more capable than the Filipinos of mounting effective resistance to foreign interference. In a futile attempt to bolster Diem’s rule, Lansdale’s country team spread false rumors of Vietminh atrocities, organized a fake resistance movement in North Vietnam and a public relations campaign in which northern defectors were given ‘forty acres’ of land to settle on in South Vietnam and a mule.99 Lansdale further coordinated a ‘Denunciation of the communist campaign’, which provided cash rewards to residents who turned in their neighbors. Paul Harwood, CIA chief of covert action, lamented that this campaign was infused with a ‘totalitarian spirit’, because of the influence of ex-Vietminh defectors recruited by the CIA who adopted ‘Vietminh methods’ like the establishment of armed
propaganda teams and detention and torture of dissidents, which helped turn the population against the government.\textsuperscript{100}

The Denounce the Communist Campaign set the groundwork for Chieu Hoi (‘Movement to Regroup Misled Members of the Resistance’ or ‘Open Arms’), which was instituted in April 1963 under the guidance of CIA agent Rufus Phillips, a Lansdale protégé. The theme song of Chieu Hoi cleverly centered on the theme of a bird flying home to his family nest. The program’s seal adopted the symbol of a white peace dove, reinforcing an aura of humanitarianism.\textsuperscript{101} In his second tour in Vietnam after a period planning clandestine operations targeting Cuba, Lansdale brought some of his former associates in the Philippines to work on Chieu Hoi, including Charles T.R. Bohannan who drew on his experience with EDCOR. Sir Robert Thompson, who oversaw British counterinsurgency policies in Malaya, first recommended the program to Diem. He considered it vital in recruiting intelligence assets who could provide information on the insurgency that would prevent the need to torture detainees.

Thompson wrote in his 1966 book, \textit{Defeating Communist Insurgency}, that the ‘natural cupidity of many members of the population soon involves them in the hunt, particularly if they know that their identity will not be revealed and that they will be paid in cash in accordance with the results’.\textsuperscript{102} These comments epitomize a cynical view of human nature, which underestimated the principled commitment of National Liberation Front fighters (NLF) and Vietnamese who had struggled for decades to achieve national independence.\textsuperscript{103} In another passage, Thompson claimed that ‘the predeliction of some insurgent leaders for either brandy or girls can provide plenty of scope for psywar experts and artists’.\textsuperscript{104} This is the same means by which white colonizers bought off native and African chiefs in the classic era of colonialism.\textsuperscript{105}

The NLF’s hatred of Chieu Hoi was epitomized by their awarding anyone who killed a Hoi Chanh with the Order of the Valiant Knights, an honor heretofore reserved for those who killed at least 10 Vietnamese and Americans.\textsuperscript{106} An important part of the program was the dissemination of over a billion leaflets and posters and thousands of hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. The messages ranged from denouncing Chinese imperialism, to playing off the longing of revolutionary soldiers for their family, to macabre photos of dead soldiers and warning of imminent death from B-52s.\textsuperscript{107} From 1966 until March 1969, USAID administrator Ogden Williams, with the assistance of Monta Osborne, a veteran of the psy-war program in Korea, employed armed teams who went into hamlets disseminating the leaflets, giving speeches and staging dramatic skits designed to counteract Vietcong armed propaganda teams, which adopted the same methods and would sometimes kill ‘imperialist collaborators’.\textsuperscript{108}

The Hoi Chans (euphemism for ‘one who has returned’) were expected to provide information on the ‘Vietcong’, and underwent a forty-day course in political indoctrination where they were shown movies and given lectures on democracy and communist crimes, briefed on the policy aims of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and given vocational training. Hoi Chanhns were in turn given an identity card and were resettled in Chieu Hoi hamlets where economic aid was concentrated. After 1967, an effort was made to place them in jobs commensurate with their experience, though a RAND Corporation report lamented that GVN officials were reluctant to reward their former enemies.\textsuperscript{109}

As with the Huk defectors, many of the Hoi Chans were recruited as irregulars in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) where their skills in the art of guerrilla war and knowledge of the jungle terrain and enemy made them valued assets. Nicknamed ‘Kit Carsons’ after the dime novel legend who served as a scout for American militias during the California Gold Rush, the Hoi Chans were sent on dangerous missions, in violation of international law, to detect and disarm mines and booby traps and assist in the detection of enemy sniper positions and ambushes. Considered to be expendable, they were usually the first in the unit to be killed. When they radioed in their position, the CIA would order some Hoi Chanh to be bombed along with the target in order to protect the secrecy of black operations.\textsuperscript{110}
The CIA’s chief strategy analyst wrote in his memoir about how CIA station chief Theodore Shackley (known as the ‘Blond Ghost’ for his cold demeanor) pushed agency personnel to ‘recruit, recruit, recruit’, which resulted in the employment of imposters who supplied phony intelligence, or double agents who used the program to infiltrate the government. In line with the tradition of colonial powers ‘using the special skills of primitive peoples against guerrilla operations in uninhabited areas’ as Valeriano and Bohannan put it, the Special Forces recruited indigenous Montagnards (French for mountaineers) and other ethnic minorities including the Hmong in Laos. By the end of the Vietnam War, 200,000 Montagnards were dead, and 85 percent of their villages were leveled in an example of how defection could bring short-term expediency but long-term misery.

A 1973 RAND Corporation report claimed that Chieu Hoi resulted in over 194,000 enemy defections. At its peak, 1969, 47,023 ‘Vietcong’ were rallying per year. Ogden Williams claimed that the ‘intelligence by product of Chieu Hoi was nothing short of spectacular’. It included revelations of VC attack plans in April 1968 that ‘led to the total failure of the enemy’s mini-Tet offensive in early May and alone more than justified total investment in the Chieu Hoi in 1968. A majority of the weapons caches including long-range rockets discovered around Saigon before they could be launched, were located as a result of the efforts of Hoi Chanhs, Armed Propaganda Teams and Kit Carson Scouts.

However, most of the defectors were of low-level rank. Another RAND Corporation study concluded that psy-war efforts made ‘no appreciable dent on the Vietcong’s overall motivation and morale structure’. The program was undermined in part because of atrocious conditions in USAID-managed prisons where potential Hoi Chanh were subjected to political indoctrination. Reports from public safety advisor William C. Benson from December 1961 pointed to a lack of latrines, proper sanitation and use of honey buckets as toilets, and noted that political prisoners [who constituted most of the inmates] were handcuffed and bolted to the floor. Benson further reported that ‘stubborn prisoners were sent to Con Son prison [known as devil’s island] for reeducation and brainwashing’ and that ‘hard cases’ (i.e. those who resisted) were ‘sent to permanent solitary confinement’.

The use of the term brainwashing is ironic because alleged communist brainwashing in Korea was a basis for the intensification of American psychological warfare programs. The atrocious conditions in the GVN prisons stemmed from vast overcrowding, which resulted from large-scale political policing operations that are integral to COIN. Corrupt GVN prison officials, most of whom were political appointees, also sold materials that had been donated for renovation on the black market. On a 1968 inspection tour, USAID adviser Donald Bordenkircher told superiors that ‘political reeducation cannot occur until you enable a man to sleep away from his own urine and feces, give him wholesome food and the opportunity for rehabilitation’. These comments point to a seminal factor underlying the failure of Chieu Hoi that has been overlooked by those who claim the U.S. could have won the war if COIN was given greater priority. In reality, COIN was employed extensively but could never work when the prisons were in this condition; a fact that was inevitable under the circumstances.

‘Devious and cruel’

In colonial wars, defectors who accepted offers of amnesty were usually motivated by pragmatic rather than ideological factors. They were tired of living the life of a guerrilla, afraid of dying, and calculated that the government forces were stronger. In the Vietnam case, the terrifying effects of U.S. carpet-bombing and use of Agent Orange to poison food crops provided an added incentive. Former CIA Chief of Military Region Three in Vietnam Orrin DeForest pointed out in his memoirs that ‘the Chieu Hoi centers were full of people whose unit had been overrun two or three times and who had just decided they had had it. Some of the North Vietnamese
defectors came in saying they were simply not going to die in the South… Quite a few talked about the B-52 bombings. They had survived the attacks (though often with ruptured eardrums) but had witnessed the horrifying results: the concussions that killed many of their friends, or burying them alive in their bunkers.  

Simulmatics, a computer company run by the head of MIT’s political science department, which received a Pentagon contract to analyze interrogation reports with the goal of improving Chieu Hoi, found that the most frequent reasons for rallying were ‘the danger and hardship of VC life; family hardship, the fear of death; disillusionment with the Vietcong, comparative strength of the GVN; petty grievances or career motives’. One of the Hoi Chanh interviewed, Mr. Son, 33, said that by rallying ‘he hoped he no longer had to live a clandestine life and that his family would be protected’. They were mainly pro-GVN because they ‘followed the side which is stronger in order to save our skin’.  

Mr. Ninh, a 56-year-old farm laborer who had been imprisoned twice by the French pointed out similarly that the reason most people rallied was ‘for security – to avoid the terrifying bombardments that indicate the GVN is stronger’. Life, he said, is ‘rugged for VC soldiers. Party members become demoralized when they ponder their sacrifices and realize that in the end, they too will probably die in combat’. A former organizer for the Vietcong Farmer’s Association, Mr. Ninh told his interviewer that the Vietcong, though occasionally cruel, were better propagandists than the GVN, prohibited gambling, drinking and other vices, and were considerate of the elderly. Some ARVN soldiers meanwhile would ‘do things wrong – steal from the people, act crudely, beat up people accused of being Vietcong and treat them rough’, while ‘the Vietcong would take care of the GVN soldier when he is wounded’. The ARVN, he added ‘wouldn’t do [this]. When they see the VC die, they cut their throats, cut their heads open, take out their liver and stomachs’, while the VC would just ‘leave the body’.  

These comments point to the contrast between the NLF and ARVN and underlying political dynamic to the war, which the psychological warfare campaign could not overcome. RAND Corporation analyst Jeannette A. Koch in a 1971 report funded by Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) recognized that the ‘Vietcong’ had ‘good leadership, discipline and a strong means of persuasion in their promise of personal advantage to uneducated and ambitious young men of humble origin who see little future in traditional Vietnamese society’. By contrast, Koch, who was personally involved with the program, described the efforts at political ‘indoctrination’ under Chieu Hoi as ‘quite sad’ since they dwelled ‘more heavily on the need to kill VC than on the GVN’s goals of peace and prosperity’. Low salaries led to corruption and many of the instructors were ‘undemocratic’, condescending and aloof from the problems of the men they were instructing. The lectures were ‘pitched at the group without regard to educational level or whether they understood much less accepted [what was being taught]’.  

In 1967, Simulmatics recommended that the ‘Vietnamese penchant for role playing which is in effect a dissociation from real life’ could be effectively exploited to make the program more effective. By this they were suggesting that a yearning for military heroism could be fulfilled as Kit Carson scouts if the GVN effectively cast itself as national saviors and the Vietcong as villains. This though was the opposite of how many Vietnamese saw things as it was the NLF who appeared as the national heroes and Robin Hoods, and ARVN as villains.  

The ARVNs poor reputation was accentuated by its wide adoption of blackmail and torture. John R. Campbell a civilian adviser recounts visiting a deserted warehouse where Hoi Chanh were being held beneath a trap-door in the dark chained to a dirt floor where they appeared to be ‘crab-like’. Historian Alfred McCoy in A Question of Torture discusses how the CIA invested in a billion dollar ‘Manhattan project of the mind’ involving cutting edge research into psychological torture methods such as sensory deprivation that were designed to emphasize a subject’s helplessness and dependence in his captor. Considering the communists to be more adept than the GVN at mobilizing peasant psychology, Simulamatics had employed behavioral psychologists to analyze Hoi Chanh detainees and develop methods for better manipulating them.
Often this could cross the line into psychological torture. In an extreme case, a detainee had a computer chip implanted in his brain in an attempt to program him, while another was placed in a freezer for a long period to exploit his fear of the cold.

Following the 1968 Tet offensive, Chieu Hoi was integrated into the Phung Hoang, or Phoenix program, named after a mythical all-seeing bird, which selectively snatches its prey. Financed by USAID and the CIA partially through illicit means, the aim of Phoenix was to better coordinate intelligence and destroy the Vietcong leadership through carefully calibrated policing operations that would avoid extensive collateral damage. The gamut of psychological warfare tactics were employed, including the use of Wanted Posters, disguises, warning leaflets and hanging victims on hooks for intimidation.

Defectors were crucial to Phoenix as members of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) which hunted the ‘Vietcong’. They provided intelligence, served as PRU interrogators and penetration agents in the attempt to counter the Vietcong’s successful infiltration of the GVN security forces. At the top of the Special Branch’s recruitment list were victims of Vietcong atrocities, or men with criminal proclivities who could be useful in the dirty work of counterinsurgency. Like their Korean War predecessors, recruits were tattooed with Sat Cong (Kill Communist) on their chests as part of an initiation ceremony devoted to trying to keep them from returning to their former VC or NVA unit. Some committed atrocities disguised as Vietcong as part of what historian Douglas Valentine terms the ‘ultimate form of psy-war’, whose goal was to ‘reinforce negative stereotypes of the Vietcong’.

Anthony Herbert in his autobiography Soldier tells how he joined a top-secret psy-war team which took charge of execution teams that wiped out entire families and tried to make it look as though the VC themselves had done the killing. Herbert warned his superiors that the death squads ‘could be motivated by revenge or personal monetary gain, and that some of the stool pigeons could be double or triple agents’; concerns he said that went overlooked.

Political scientists Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher estimated that Phoenix victimized thirty-eight innocents for every one actual Viet Cong (VC) agent. NLF leaders could evade capture by having access to safe houses and the support of a well-developed political infrastructure. Phoenix operatives also used the program to settle personal scores, fitting a pattern of colonial counterinsurgency in which local actors ‘bent and twisted imperial military ambition to suit their localized agendas’, as two historians put it. The net effect was to divide Vietnamese society and create a vicious cycle of violence that extended past the war when GVN loyalists were sent to re-education camps.

During the early 1970s, the American antiwar movement caught wind of Phoenix as journalists published numerous exposés detailing the excesses of the program, which was characterized by a senior North Vietnamese officer as ‘devious and cruel’. The United States by this point had lost the political and information war and was on its way to defeat. A main difference from the Philippines was the strength of the nationalist opposition, which war architect Robert S. McNamara belatedly acknowledged, and extravagant corruption of U.S. government allies, which could not be sugarcoated.

Not long after the liberation of Saigon, Edward Lansdale and Phoenix program director Robert Komer began promoting the myth that the U.S. had lost the Vietnam War because of an over-emphasis on body counts and high military technology over pacification and psychological warfare programs capable of winning ‘hearts and minds’. In subsequent literature, Lansdale, John Paul Vann and General Creighton Abrams were depicted as visionaries for fighting in vain against a military hierarchy wedded to conventional military doctrine. John Nagl in his influential COIN manual Learning How to Eat Soup from a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam considers as a turning point in the war the rejection of Edward Lansdale’s appointment as ambassador in 1961. Nagl further criticized the rigidity of the senior officer corps in spurning the advice of the British advisory mission and others who promoted ‘more carrot than big stick’. 
Nagl, however, and others who promote a similar view fail to critically assess the motives underlying U.S. intervention that made the presence of American forces in Vietnam unpopular regardless of the military strategy pursued. Nor the fact that the political weakness of the Saigon regime was insurmountable because of the circumstances in which it took power, nor how U.S. counterinsurgency practices were rooted in colonial methods and contributed to stark human rights abuses that alienated the populace.

This essay has attempted to show that one cannot separate larger military operations from soft power approaches. They are part of the same policy designed to achieve strategic aims, including establishing military bases and opening the nation’s economy to foreign investment, which are often at odds with the interests of the local population. American counterinsurgents valued amnesty and defector programs primarily for their intelligence gathering function. They served as a form of political warfare designed to create positive public relations, and have usually gone together with an escalation of state terror campaigns directed against ‘irreconcilables’. This pattern has been-replicated in the War on Terror, where General David Petraeus cultivated a team of journalists and military intellectuals to promote the army’s counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-24, which emphasized the function of U.S. soldiers as ‘goodwill ambassadors’ while noting the importance of defectors as human intelligence sources.144 Hidden from view was the consequence of expanded night-raid and targeted assassination operations run by General Stanley McChrystal, who was described by a senior Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) official as a ‘cold blooded killer’.145

The foreword to the army’s new manual, significantly, was written by Nagl, Petraeus’ deputy who promoted a sanitized view of history while helping to reinvigorate what Pentagon whistle-blower Daniel Ellsberg referred to as ‘the cult of Edward Lansdale’.146 This cult has placed a high primacy on psychological warfare functions whose central purpose is to create a humanitarian aura underlying programs designed essentially to ‘civilize them with a krag’ as Lansdale, in one of his more candid moments, admitted.147 The extension of the psychological warfare to the American public is a crucial factor that allows for this aura to be sustained year after year, and for history to repeat itself in yet more atrocious ways.

Notes
7. See Gentile, Wrong Turn.


20. See James Peck, Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2006). Beset by significant internal problems, China was never very aggressive and its threat was greatly overblown.


22. Edward Hunter, Brainwashing in Red China: The Calculated Destruction of Men’s Minds (New York: Vanguard, 1951), 223, 302. Albert D. Biderman, a social scientist who reviewed interviews with 235 Air Force POW’s, wrote that Communists’ techniques designed to ‘extort false confessions’ were similar to that that ‘inquisitors had employed for centuries’. They did nothing that ‘was not common practice to police and intelligence interrogators of other times and nations’. See Albert A. Biderman, March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War (New York: McMillan, 1963), and also Robert Jay Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of ‘Brainwashing’ in China, rev ed. (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 1988).


24. Ibid., 1, 2.


37. Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 36.
40. Burchett and Winnington, *Koje Unscreened; Burchett, This Monstrous War*.
41. Burchett and Winnington, *Koje Unscreened*. Army intelligence veteran Donald Pease writes that ‘POWs who were slow to learn were often beaten by the security unit members and some were killed’. *PSYWAR*, 145.
42. Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 90; Heenan, *From Traveler to Traitor*, 112; Burchett and Winnington, *Koje Unscreened*.
44. See ie. Dan Levin, ‘To Remember Beijing, Indelibly’, *The New York Times*, August 22, 2008. The author points out that some Chinese were breaking the taboo by getting tattoos to celebrate the 2008 Beijing Olympics. He writes that ‘tattoos were considered disreputable in China for centuries. Imperial courts tattooed criminals’ faces before sending them into exile. By the 1949 revolution, the tattoo was the favored mark of crime syndicates and subsequently condemned by the Communist Party. Today, tattoos remain taboo for many of China’s elder generation, which sneers at the sight of a sun or lotus inked on the back of a trendy neighbor’.
45. Burchett and Winnington, *Koje Unscreened*; Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 36.
47. Burchett and Winnington, *Koje Unscreened*.
48. Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 36. The South Korean Truth commission found that the U.S.-ROK-side was responsible for 83 percent of the atrocities in the Korean War, a fact that psywar efforts helped cover up. See Jeremy Kuzmarov, ‘Barbarism Unleashed’ http://peacehistory-usfp.org/korean-war/
55. Currey, Edward Lansdale, p. 188. The song is available at: https://frontierpartisans.com/13550/civilize-krag/. The verse read: ‘Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos!
Cut throat khakiac ladrões!
Underneath the starry flag,
Civilize them with a Krag*;
And return us to our beloved home’.


58. William Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1974), 38, Boot, The Road Not Taken, 139; Currey, Edward Lansdale, 131, 132. William Lacey, the deputy chief of mission stated it was ‘crystal clear that the influence of the United States is highly important if not [the] decisive factor in the political life of the Philippines’. American embassy Manila to Department of State Washington, ‘Embassy Meddling in Philippines Politics’, March 31, 1953, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Philippines, 796.001, NA, Box 4317.

59. Cullather, Illusions of Influence, chapters 4, 5 and 6. A base agreement was signed after Magsaysay’s death in 1959 by his successor Carlos Garcia. It enabled the U.S. to enlarge Subic Bay and Sangley Point and gave it access to three joint-use training sites. Magsaysay earned some of his domestic support through anti-Chinese action including laws that were designed to shield manufacturing from Chinese encroachment. This was satisfying to the Eisenhower administration as were Magsaysay’s neoliberalist efforts to curtail the state sector. U.S. overseas investment in the Philippines reached all-time peaks under Magsaysay in 1956 and 1957.

60. Cullather, Illusions of Influence, 101; ‘Head Off the Fascist Offensive!’ ‘A New Year Message to the Philippines Army from the Hukbalahap’, American embassy Manila, February 9, 1951, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Philippines, 796.001, NA, Box 4319; Mark Moyer, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 98, Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty, 147. Seagrave refers to Valeriano as ‘Lansdale’s chief peasant killer’. He discusses his role as head of the Nenita death squad which would kill farmers and display their bodies for intimidation.

61. ‘How the CIA’s Edward Lansdale Groomed Ramon Magsaysay to be President of the Philippines’, Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty.

62. Boot, The Road Not Taken, 139; Currey, Edward Lansdale, 89, 90, 113, 125. Another possible candidate for American support, Senator Lorenzo Tanaña, was discarded after he gave a speech suggesting that American military bases should be removed from Philippines soil.


67. ‘The Case of William J. and Celia Mariano Pomeroy’, July 12, 1952, American embassy Manila, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Philippines, 796.001, NA, Box 4319.


José Cristol who helped design the program acknowledged that the ‘rural projects were not effective for what they accomplished because they were very small compared to the total agrarian problem’. Rather, he said, they were effective for ‘the method in which they were publicized and advertised’. Kervliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, 239. Historian Nick Cullather in *Illusions of Influence* (102) highlights that EDCOR was a repackaging of the Quirino administration’s Land Settlement and Development Corporation which had been establishing colony farms in Mindanao since 1939.
76. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism*, 112.
77. Douglas, *Asia 1952*, 26-30; Douglas, *North from Malaya*, 132, 133. Douglas wrote that the ‘sum of the resettlement projects’ did not ‘add up to much’, noting that the ‘bulk of cultivated land is still held by absentee landlords’ and that there was ‘no agricultural credit bank, no marketing agencies, no guarantees against usurious interest, no price protection whatsoever for farm produce. The absentee landlords and the Chinese moneylenders feast on the land. The man who works the land, who takes his wife and children to the fields to make enough to hold body and soul together – this man is as poor and as miserable today as he was when the liquidation of the Huks began’.
81. ‘Information to Department of State About the Huks Supplied by Correspondent of the Philippines Free Press’, April 13, 1950, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, 1950-1954, Philippines, 796.00, NA, box 4315.
84. Cullather, *Illusions of Influence*, 108, 117, 118; Pomeroy *An American Made Tragedy* 27, 28; McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire*, 383. Magsaysay’s land reform plan depended on the U.S. to pay for the expropriation of large estates, which the fiscally conservative Eisenhower administration refused to do. On election manipulation, see Blum, *Killing Hope*, 43 and Boot, *The Road Not Taken*, 139. The list of CIA dirty tricks included money laundering, arson and blackmail.
91. Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*, 117. Draconian anti-subversive laws remained a basis at that time for arresting and killing Huk leaders like Prudencio Opinianzo, who set up a successor organization called the Philippines for Poor Farmers.

92. Cullather, *Illusions of Influence*, 91; Pomeroy, *An American Made Tragedy*, 82, 83; Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, 243. The Korean War increased demand for copra, which was used in explosives. Philippine export earnings increased by 30 percent a year in 1950 and 1951, which increased confidence in the government.


94. Douglas Valentine, ‘A Bad Vietnam Lesson for Afghanistan’, *Consortium News*, September 17, 2009. Observers found that Lansdale had a curious gleam in his eye like Hollywood hucksters such as Elmer Gant, and was certifiably insane.


98. Numerous books have detailed Diem’s political failings including recently Phillip Catton, *Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam* (Lawrence: university Press of Kansas, 2003) and Edward Miller, *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). Diem had ideas of his own that conflicted with Lansdale and other advisers and his regime came to be seen as an unsalvageable political liability after the 1963 Buddhist crisis. He was at that time overthrown in a CIA backed coup and killed along with his brother, Nhu.

99. See Nashel, *Edward Lansdale’s Cold War*.


104. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 94.


108. Chieu Hoi after 1969 was led by Eugene V. Bable, a career CIA officer who had served with Ralph Johnson in World War II aviators in China. The defectors would also sometimes leave a VC head on a spike in the villages they went to for intimidation purposes.


Shackley and the CIA's Crusades (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Overt bribes, sex and drugs were sometimes used to recruit defectors.


117. William C. Benson to John McCabe, December 12, 1961; William C. Benson to Frank Walton, Visit to Bien Hoa

118. Increasing the Effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program, Vol. II: Functional Aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program


120. See David M. Anderson, Modernizing Repression


128. Increasing the Effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program, Vol. II: Functional Aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program

129. John R. Campbell, Are We Winning? Are They Winning?: A Civilian Advisors Reflections on War and Vietnam

130. Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).


133. Valentine, The Phoenix Program.


147. According to Lansdale’s biographer Cecil B. Currey, Lansdale in the early 1960s was vociferous in opposing an American Congressman who wanted to establish an archive in Manila as a repository for Philippine ‘revolutionary documents’ and as a memorial for the martyred Magsaysay. Currey writes that Lansdale ‘hit the ceiling’, pointing out to the idea’s sponsors ‘the danger of release of documents from our archives (or how we civilized ‘em with a Krag)’. Currey, *Edward Lansdale*, 188.

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**Notes on contributor**

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